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Abstract 
This paper aims at analysing whether the concept of cultural relativism is useful in discussing 
gender violence in multicultural societies, particularly, in the cultural defence cases. It is based 
on a theoretical discussion supplemented by some qualitative case studies. It concludes that 
although cultural relativism highlights “toleration” and helps to understand “the contextual 
nature of any principles of justice”, it has more negative implications than benefits.  It prevents 
normative judgement about harmful cultural practises; it equates culture to views of some 
dominant groups and therefore obscures some underlying reasons for violence against women; it 
undermines some women’s agency by constituting them as victims of “cultures” and it might 
articulate with “nationalist” and “racist” discourses by freezing group differences. In accordance 
with this, it also provides further thoughts on Turkey by examining the implications of the 
framing “honour killings” as a matter of “tradition” or “custom” (töre).  
Öz 
Bu makalenin amacı çokkültürlü toplumlardaki cinsiyete/toplumsal cinsiyete dayalı şiddet 
tartışmalarında, özellikle kültürel savunma vakalarında, kültürel görecelilik kavramının 
kullanımını analiz etmektedir. Çalışma, niteliksel örneklerle desteklenmiş teorik tartışmaya 
dayanmaktadır. Makalede, kültürel göreceliliğin toleransı vurguladığı ve adalet ilkelerinin 
bağlamsal doğasını gösterdiği teslim edilmiş ancak faydasından çok negatif içerimleri olduğu 
ifade edilmiştir. Bu kavramın kullanımının; zararlı kültürel pratikler hakkında normatif 
değerlendirmeyi önlendiği, kültürü egemen grupların görüşleriyle eşitlediği ve böylelikle kadına 
yönelik şiddetin altında yatan nedenlerin üstünü kapattığı, kadınları “kültür”lerin kurbanı 
şeklinde göstererek onların failliğini zayıflattığı ve grup farklılıklarını dondurarak milliyetçi ve 
ırkçı görüşlerle eklemlenebileceği sonucuna varılmıştır. Bu doğrultuda, “namus cinayetlerinin” 
bir “gelenek” ya da “töre” meselesi olarak ele alınmasının/ifade edilmesinin ima ettiği anlamların 
incelenmesi suretiyle, Türkiye üzerine de düşünceler sunulmuştur.  
 
Uses of culture and ‘cultural relativism’ in gender violence discussions *
1. Introduction 
One of the areas where cultural relativism comes to the forefront is women’s human rights issues 
in multicultural societies. In some instances, “culture” is used as an explanation or an excuse for 
gender based violence in order to justify some harmful cultural practices and/or to obtain 
mitigation in some criminal justice cases. This point raises important questions about the role of 
“culture” in men’s control over women, in the form of violence against women (VAW) and the 
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degree to which a “culture” should be respected or tolerated in multicultural societies, when it 
violates women’s human rights.  
Some feminists argue that if a “minority culture” perpetuates gender violence, it is better 
to let them to become extinct rather than protecting them under the rubric of multiculturalism -or 
at least promote change so that they could catch up with the equality standards held in the 
“majority culture”.  They claim that multiculturalism could be partly blamed for the legitimation 
of gender based violence.  Others draw attention to the fact that no “culture” is exempt from 
gender based violence, though there might be changes in the form of violence against women in 
different “cultures”, and suggest that more thorough analyses should be done in order to 
understand the relation between gender violence and culture.  
In the context of these, this paper discusses whether the concept of cultural relativism is 
useful in discussing gender violence in multicultural societies2, particularly, in the cultural 
defence cases.3 It is based on a theoretical discussion supplemented by some qualitative case 
studies. It begins by explaining the gender violence discussions in multicultural societies. In the 
following section, it looks at the relationship between “multiculturalism” and “cultural 
relativism”. It analyses the way that cultural relativism approaches to “culture” and then suggests 
a more plausible account of culture. Lastly, it criticizes the cultural defense cases and discusses 
the challenges that cultural relativism poses in gender violence discussions. It concludes that 
although cultural relativism helps to understand “the contextual nature of any principles of 
justice”, it deters normative judgement about harmful cultural practises; it reduces culture to its 
partial representations and therefore obstructs important factors that contribute violence against 
women; it undermines women’s agency by constituting them as victims of “cultures” and it 
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might articulate with “nationalist” and “racist” discourses by freezing group differences. In 
accordance with this, this article also provides further thoughts on Turkey by examining the 
implications of the framing “honour killings” as a matter of “tradition” or “custom” (töre). 
2. Gender based violence discussions 
A. Gender based violence and forms of it 
“Gender violence” or “gender based violence” terms are used interchangeably to highlight the 
role of power in the practice of such violence and endorses that sex is not the sole factor 
designating the power that a person has. It shows that gender based violence is not limited to 
violence against women also covers the experience of men and boys. However, women are 
influenced by gender based violence disproportionately for a long time.4 Therefore, I will 
concentrate on violence against women in the remainder of the article. 
Violence against women has started to be regarded as an international priority and a 
universal harm in late 1980s through ongoing efforts of women’s activism. The Economic and 
Social Council and the Commission on the Status of Women put forth that further international 
measures should be undertaken to combat this problem in 1991. As a result of this, general 
recommendation No. 19 on VAW was adopted by the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1992 (Coomaraswamy, 2003, p.5).  For the first 
time, “gender based violence” is interpreted as form of discrimination and was defined as 
“violence directed against a woman because she is a women or which affects women 
disproportionately” (CEDAW, 1992). It also gave an impetus to the adoption of the UN 
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women in 1993 (Merry, 2006, p.76 cited in 
Reilly, 2009, p.72-73).5  This Declaration recognizes that “violence against women is a 
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manifestation of historically unequal power relations between men and women, which have led 
to domination over and discrimination against women by men” (U.N. General Assembly, 1993). 
Thus, it acknowledges that VAW “is not an endemic but it is socially constructed and historically 
justified” (Coomaraswamy and Kois, 1999, p.183).  The Declaration defines violence against 
women as: “any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, 
sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or 
arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life” (U.N. General 
Assembly, 1993).  Therefore, it reduces the public and private distinction and holds states 
responsible for the acts of violence that occurs in private sphere. As violence against women is 
accepted as a human rights violation, it calls on state “to ensure the prevention, investigation and 
punishment of perpetrators” (Coomaraswamy and Kois, 1999, p.178) and “not invoke any 
custom, tradition or religious consideration to avoid their obligations with respect to its 
elimination” (U.N. General Assembly, 1993). Therefore, according to the Declaration custom, 
tradition or religious beliefs should not be accepted as an excuse for violence against women. 
One of the former Special Rapporteurs on Violence Against Women lists cultural practices 
which are violent towards women as female genital mutilation, honour killings, the pledging of 
girls for economic and cultural appeasement, witch-hunting, caste, marriage, discriminatory 
laws, son preference, restrictive practices (i.e. foot binding), practices that violate women’s 
reproductive rights, beauty and incest.6 She also adds that cultural relativism poses an important 





B. How is gender based violence discussed in multicultural societies: Cultural 
defence cases 
One of the most salient examples where culture relativism is used in gender violence discussions 
in multicultural societies is cultural defense cases. “Cultural defense” is based on the idea that 
“persons socialized in a minority or foreign culture, who regularly conduct themselves in 
accordance with their own cultural norms, should not be held fully accountable for conduct that 
violates officials law, if that conduct conforms to the prescriptions of their own culture” 
(Magnarella, 1991 cited in Philips, 2010, p.84). Some state that if there is a cultural defense, 
there should be also a cultural offense, which is an act -by a member of minority culture- that 
conforms to minority culture, however, constitutes an offense according to majority culture. In 
addition to this, it is stated that a link should be established between the offense and cultural 
background before the cultural defense is admitted in the courts (Philips, 2010, p.85). 
The use of cultural defense is problematic on four grounds. Firstly, it weakens legal 
universalism. It gives primacy to the cultural membership rather than other types of 
memberships. Secondly, it might lead to opportunistic defenses. Cultural practices are contested 
and it is not always clear whether the subject of cultural defense is a normal practice in that 
culture. Some people, who do not follow some harmful cultural practices, may rediscover them 
when they think that they will benefit from these practices in the courts. Thirdly, cultural 
defenses might contribute to patriarchy by acknowledging cultural practices as “a legitimate 
element in criminal defense”. Fourthly, cultural defenses can reproduce “stereotypical 
representation of Western other” (Philips, 2010, pp.85-87). 
One of the most significant articles which covers three of the concerns related to the uses 
of cultural defence (impairment of legal universalism7, contested nature of cultural practices8 and 
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the strengthening of patriarchy9) is  “Is multiculturalism bad for women?” by Susan Moller Okin. 
In this article, Okin argues that there is a marked tension between feminism10 and multiculturalist 
commitment to group rights for minority cultures.11 She states that despite the fact that most 
cultures are patriarchal; minority cultures, but not all of them, are more patriarchal than 
surrounding cultures. Some of the contentious customs such as clitoridectomy, polygamy, and 
the marriage of children or marriages that are otherwise coerced are retained in these cultures 
and declared as necessary for controlling women. Although there are different forms of 
discrimination against women in Western liberal cultures, they significantly move away from 
harmful traditional practices against women: at least, women enjoy freedoms and opportunities 
equally with man through legal guarantees (Okin, 1999, pp.14-17). Giving special rights to 
groups will reinforce dominant subgroups and conservative interpretations of cultural norms 
rather than reformative and innovative ones. Since women does not take place within the more 
powerful groups and advocates of women’s rights do not attach themselves to these subgroups, 
both women and those supporting their rights and equal status are adversely affected by group 
rights (Tamir, 1999, p.47).   
In the context of cultural defence cases in the U.S., Okin suggests that main argument 
presented by members of cultural groups is the idea that women are not morally equal to men; 
they are subordinates whose main duty is to serve man sexually and domestically. To exemplify 
this, she lists four cases where cultural defences have been successfully employed and bring 
about reduction in sentence or secure dropped charges or sentences:  
(1) kidnap and rape by Hmong men who claim that their actions are part of their 
cultural practice of zij poj niam, or “marriage by capture”; (2)wife-murder by 
immigrants from Asian and Middle Eastern countries whose wives have either 
committed adultery or treated their husbands in a servile way; (3) murder of 
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children by Japanese or Chinese mothers who have also tried but failed to kill 
themselves, and who claim that because of their cultural backgrounds the shame 
of their husbands’ infidelity drove them to the culturally condoned practice of 
mother-child suicide; and (4) in France- though not yet in United States, in part 
because the practice was criminalized only in 1996- clitoridectomy. (Okin, 1999, 
p.18) 
Okin claims that cultural defences breach women’s and children’s right to equal 
protection of laws through accepting culture as an excuse or mitigating factor and therefore “by 
failing to protect women and sometimes children of minority cultures from male and sometimes 
maternal violence” (Okin, 1999, p.20) Okin’s emphasis on the minority women to be affected by 
group rights is quite similar to the language used in the UN Declaration of Elimination on the 
Violence against Women. In its preamble, Declaration states that “some groups of women, such 
as women belonging to minority groups, migrant women... are especially vulnerable to violence” 
(U.N. General Assembly, 1993). In general, Okin’s arguments comply with protection of 
women’s human rights. However, her approach differs from human rights doctrine with regards 
to the protection of right to culture.12  
3. Multiculturalism, cultural relativism and culture 
Okin accuses cultural defences of violating women’s right to equal protection of laws (Okin, 
1999, p.20). In parallel with this, multiculturalism is blamed for holding the idea that all cultures 
are equally worthy of respect. Building on this idea, it is claimed that multiculturalism instigated 
a cultural relativism and this has led to impossibility in setting apart right from wrong. Critics 
assert that culture, in this sense, “is operating as a reason for public inaction and an excuse for 
immoral behaviour” (Philips, 2007, p.73).   
When multiculturalism is regarded as depending on cultural relativism, this interpretation 
brings it in conflict with feminism, since feminism suggests that gender violence should not be 
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justified by culture. This interpretation of multiculturalism is similar to the Okin’s position.13 
There is a merit in the argument that multiculturalism does not represent true interpretations of 
culture (i.e. it may lead to conservative interpretations) or it gives priority to the preferences of 
the group over the rights of individuals (Philips, 2007, p.73). However, it is not true that 
multiculturalism is per se leading to cultural relativism, therefore justification of gender violence 
by culture. Most of the supporters of multiculturalism do not assert that all cultures have equal 
moral value. In addition to this, in the policy level, it is hard to find any single country that acts 
impartially towards different cultures in its territory without prioritising some norms and values. 
Furthermore, more evidence is needed in order to establish whether or to what extent violence 
against women is not intervened or unchecked in practice because of multicultural policies 
(Philips, 2007, p.73).  
In order to make clear the relationship between multicultural policies, cultural 
relativism, culture and gender violence; first cultural relativism will be examined and then I will 
assess uses of culture in gender based violence discussions in multicultural societies.  
A. What is cultural relativism? 
Cultural relativism assumes that “ethical standards are inevitably relative to culture or 
circumstance…moral norms and values of a group are uniquely determined by cultural and 
environmental factors, then it is impossible for them to be changed” (Nickel 1987, p.71). There 
are two accounts of cultural relativism: descriptive relativism and prescriptive one. The first 
form, an empirical sociological account, claims that moral beliefs, values and practices are so 
distinct from each other as they predicate on time and place. Therefore, it is impossible to 
pinpoint a moral code which is relevant for all human groups (Fagan 2009, p.54). The second 
form as a moral position accepts normative diversity and tolerance among diverse human groups. 
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In its strongest form, tolerance is accepted as the only valid universal norm whereas the modest 
form holds a small number of broad universal norms which would not contradict with local 
standards and practices (Nickel 1987, p.74).  
Cultural relativism is important with regards to revealing “the contextual nature of any 
principles of justice”. It shows that the change in values and ideas depends on historical 
conditions (Philips, 2010, p.16). However, it raises some problems. Firstly, it exaggerates “the 
incommensurability of discourses that arise in the contemporary societies” (Philips, 2010, p.17). 
If radical incommensurability holds true, people would not have been able to identify and 
interpret each other’s beliefs, desires and utterances. Moreover, some accounts of 
incommensurability obscures “many subtle epistemic and moral negotiations that take place 
across the cultures, within cultures…in dealing with discrepancy, ambiguity, discordancy and 
conflict” (Benhabib, 2002, p.31). Secondly, it misrepresents cultures and societies as “internally 
coherent and seamless wholes” (Benhabib, 2002, p.25). It develops a view of a culture which 
corresponds to a society, therefore to a nation (or nation of origin). Thus, cultural relativism 
overlooks the complexity of interactions between cultures and it strengthens the binary 
opposition between “us” and “the others”. By assuming there is an overlap between community 
of solidarity and community of ethnicity, it tries to delimit one’s membership only to ethnically 
constituted community. However, people are members of different communities on the basis of 
different interests, ideas and needs and these may not necessarily build on ethnicity (Benhabib, 
2002 pp.25-33).  Cultural relativism might also lead to “a troubling suspension of judgment 
when competing principles collide” (Philips, 2010, p.17). However, the juxtaposition of gender 
equality and cultural equality as competing equality claims, or two different competing 
principles is wrong; since such a separation between culture and gender assumes that there is a 
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de-gendered culture. However, when something is regarded as de-gendered, it is quite likely for 
masculine interpretations to override and dominate possible other interpretations (Philips, 2010, 
p.47). Therefore, this analytical separation between culture and gender could reproduce 
patriarchal interpretations of cultural traditions.  
B. What is culture and how culture is understood by cultural relativism? 
As it is shown above, there are two different and related ways that relativism approaches to 
culture. Firstly, it views cultures as “internally coherent and seamless wholes”. This is what is 
termed as “cultural reification” - the belief that “cultures are monolithic, internally self-
consistent and externally sealed of from other influences” (Philips, 2010, p.31). Secondly, 
viewing cultures as monolithic and self-consistent entities and as incommensurable wholes 
assumes that there is an essence in each culture that characterises it and marks it out. Therefore, 
it leads to cultural essentialism that regards “culture as the property of an ethnic group or race” 
(Benhabib, 2002, p.4). However, the reification and essentialisation of culture and 
overemphasizing their homogeneity brings about“reductionist sociology of culture”. In addition 
to it, this account of culture constitutes a false epistemology (Benhabib, 2002, p.4). Therefore, 
first I will look at problems related to cultural essentialism and then, I will suggest a more 
plausible account of culture.  
When essentialism14 is interpreted in terms of culture, four points become prominent. 
Firstly, culture specific essentialist generalizations are similar to Universalist essentialist 
generalizations. The only difference between them is the “degree and scope of the generalization, 
not the kind”. Secondly, cultural essentialism builds on and creates the binaries between 
“Western culture” and “Non-Western cultures” or between “Western culture” and particular 
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“Other cultures”.  There is always a discourse about culture difference. This discourse 
naturalizes cultural differences as if the discourse itself does not construct differences, and as if 
cultural differences are pre-given and prediscursively real. Thirdly, cultural essentialism 
presumes that dominant subgroups in the culture represent the values, worldview, and practices 
of all members of that culture. It, thus, has a partial picture of culture. Fourthly, according to this 
view, culturally dominant norms of feminity and practices that adversely affect women constitute 
fundamental elements of “cultural identity”. “They often equate women’s conformity to the 
status quo with “the preservation of culture” and cast feminist challenges to norms and practices 
that adversely affect women as “cultural betrayals”” (Narayan, 2000, pp.81-85).  
In short, cultural essentialism, therefore cultural relativism views cultures as natural and 
as they exist in isolation from each other. It does not grasp that “cultural difference” is created by 
human beings who wants to distinguish between cultures for different aims.  “It rely on a picture 
that presents cultures…as “unchanging givens”...whereby their “values, practices, and 
traditions,” as well as their sense of what their culture amounts to and what its “preservation” 
entails, appear immune to history”(Narayan, 2000, pp.86-88). However, “to delineate a culture” 
is a political act. Therefore, treating cultures as “unchanging givens” is quite problematic 
(Philips, 2007, p.45). Cultures come into being, “change and are maintained through social 
interactions and political struggle” (Song, 2005, p.474). Therefore, more plausible account of 
culture is necessary to understand the relationship between gender violence and cultural 
relativism.  
If it could be seen that cultures are socially constructed through social interactions, it 
would be clear that they are always subject to change (Song, 2005, p.474). When cultures are 
made and remade by people, they rely on different local, national and global resources (Philips, 
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2007, p.45). Global economy, transnational communications, migrations of people across 
borders are important factors that contribute cultural change. It is possible to suggest that “almost 
all cultures are multiculturally constituted” (Parekh 2000 cited in Song, 2005, p. 475). Therefore, 
cultures are “constant creations, re-creations, and negotiations of imaginary boundaries between 
“we” and the “other(s)” (Benhabib, 2002, p.8). Boundaries between cultures are permeable. It 
could be said that there are an internal struggles over values, practices, and meanings in each 
culture. Therefore, authoritative interpretations of culture could not be understood without 
comprehending the political agenda of some of the subgroups (Philips, 2007, p.45). These views 
weaken the notion of cultures as “internally coherent and seamless wholes” and suggest that 
culture is better understood if their “hybridity” and “polyvocality” are recognized. Cultures are 
“multilayered, decentered and fractured systems of action and signification” (Benhabib, 2002, 
p.25). 
4. Discussion: The critique of uses of culture and cultural relativism in gender based 
violence discussions 
Uses of culture 
As we have seen above, Okin states that despite the fact that most cultures are patriarchal; 
minority cultures, but not all of them, are more patriarchal than surrounding cultures. However, 
there are some issues this view raises. Cultures are not as patriarchal as Okin states and it could 
not be said, without reservation, that minority cultures are more patriarchal than Western 
majority cultures. Okin’s view of minority cultures obstructs us from seeing “sources of minority 
women’s subordination that do not stem from within their cultural communities but structural 
forces beyond their communities” (Song, 2005, p.486). Okin does not state what majority 
cultures should do in order to meet equality standards where as it imposes some solutions on the 
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minority cultures (An-Na’im, 1999). It treats majority cultures as neutral and value-free. 
Equalizing the “information submitted as evidence for criminal cultural defense” to the culture 
itself, Okin reproduces monolithic discourse of cultural stereotype (Bhabbha, 1999, p.81).  
 
The critique of cultural defence 
 
Okin thinks that cultural defence is violating women’s equal protection of law, therefore, violates 
the equality principle, therefore it weakens legal universalism and it leads to conservative 
interpretation of culture. This critique of culture defence also raises some problems. Firstly, this 
interpretation overlooks the fact that cultural defences are successful when there is an overlap 
between the norms of minority and majority culture, in other words, when evidence  “enable 
judges and juries to fit defendant’s actions into a pattern already familiar through mainstream 
culture...in the end, is it the sameness not the difference that matters” (Philips, 2010, p.103). 
Therefore, the way culture is used in these types of defences are gendered. They characterise 
women as passive and create a background where men’s violent actions would be justified. As 
Benhabib perceptively states “the cultural defence strategy imprisons the individual in a cage of 
univocal cultural interpretations and psychological motivations; individual’s intentions are 
reduced to cultural stereotypes; moral agency is reduced to cultural puppetry” (Benhabib, 2002, 
p.89) 
 
Critique of cultural relativism in gender violence discussions 
In the light of the above critiques, it could be said that the use of culture relativism in gender 
violence debates is not beneficial, rather it is problematic. Although it demonstrates “the 
contextual nature of any principles of justice”, this fact does not alone make it beneficial for 
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gender violence discussions. Firstly, cultural relativism might deter normative judgement on the 
basis of universal standards under the pretext of respecting “culture” in the instances of gender 
violence. Cultural relativist view allows “selective labeling” through which dominant social 
groups have the ability to determine what types of changes are “cultural loses” and what kind of 
changes are to be resisted  under the guise of  “cultural preservation” (Narayan, 2000, pp. 86-89). 
For example, it is suggested that Hindu practice of Sati, according to which a recently widowed 
women immolates herself on her husband’s funeral pyre, was rather a marginal practice in Hindu 
communities and reinvented as a tradition as a result of negotiations between British colonials 
and local Indians elites (Narayan, 1997 cited in Benhabib, 2002, p.6). Therefore, what is 
tolerated as a cultural tradition may be tricky. Cultural practices are always in flux. Therefore, a 
women’s human rights defender should be able to raise universal standards, on which there is a 
huge consensus, when there is violence against women. Secondly, cultural relativism reduces 
culture to its partial representations through selective labelling, therefore wrongly represents as if 
only “the culture” is responsible from violence against women. However, it is not culture per se 
that’s responsible from violence against women, but man’s control over man, the social relations 
which produced patriarchy (Walby, 1990). Thirdly, the use of cultural relativism in gender 
violence discussion reduces the agency of ‘Third World Women’ as if all of them are passive 
victims (Mohanty, 1991, p.57). However, ‘Third World Women’ are not “passive victims”. In 
many countries, including Turkey, when women are exposed to violence and go to the police 
department in order to make complaint about their husbands, it is most of the time police 
officials who thinks that these cases as “private matters”, therefore, do not take complaints 
seriously. Fourthly, the use of cultural relativism in these discussions risks ‘freezing existing 
group differences’ (Benhabib, 2002). Therefore, it might articulate with “nationalist” and “racist” 
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discourses about different cultures through stereotyping and it could feed xenophobia. Moreover, 
by claiming that there is a “fixed, homogenous culture” to be respected, it overlooks intra-and 
inter cultural interaction. This may block useful cultural interactions which would create positive 
changes about violence against women. As Philips shows, cultures defences are accepted when 
there is conformity between majority and minority culture. Thus, cultural defence is accepted in 
the Courts when two culture share the same idea. Therefore, the use of cultural relativism in 
gender violence discussions shields majority-Western- culture from criticism about violence 
against women. As a last point, no “culture” is exempt from gender violence; it is not the 
“culture” per se but the patriarchal relations in the “culture” that perpetuates violence against 
women, therefore, rather than the “culture”, the patriarchal relations within it should addressed 
and changed to combat violence against women.   
5. Conclusion and further thoughts on Turkey 
This article has considered the question of whether the concept of cultural relativism is useful in 
discussing gender violence in multicultural societies. It concludes that although cultural 
relativism highlights “toleration” and helps to understand “the contextual nature of any principles 
of justice”, it has more negative implications than benefits.  It prevents normative judgement 
about harmful cultural practises; it equates culture to views of some dominant groups and 
therefore obscures some underlying reasons for violence against women; it undermines some 
women’s agency by constituting them as victims of “cultures” and it might articulate with 
“nationalist” and “racist” discourses by freezing group differences.  
In the light of these, I will make some observations about Turkey and highlight some 
points feminists should beware of.  The uses of culture as a mitigating circumstance in cultural 
defense cases and the broader theoretical and social consequences of it have been outlined above. 
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Contrary to the U.S. example, “culture” framed under the name of “custom” or “tradition” (töre) 
leads to an aggravated penalty in the case of “honour killings” (namus cinayetleri) in Turkey.  In 
that sense, “cultural difference” is not tolerated by the law and this has some negative 
consequences in terms of the stigmatization of a certain community. From this perspective, 
another dimension of uses of culture in gender violence discussions will be briefly examined 
below. 
Article 82 (j) of the new Turkish Penal Code (Law Nr. 5237) identifies “killings in the 
name of custom” as “qualified form of felonious homicide” (voluntary manslaughter).15 
However, it does not directly refer to “honour killings”.16 Whereas the imposition of an 
aggravated sentence is required for the homicide committed in the name of the “custom”, lenient 
sentences are given to the same sort of crimes if committed in the name of “honour”, since 
“honour” is not listed as one of the aggravating circumstances for homicide in the Penal Code. 
Although the Justification of Article 29, entitled “Unjust Acts”, prohibits sentence reductions in 
the case of “honour killings”17, there are some loopholes in the law18 and Courts still grant 
sentence reductions in honour killing cases.19  
The absence of the term “honour” in the new Turkish Penal Code and  framing “honour 
killings” under the narrow heading of “custom killings” (töre cinayeti) implies that “these 
killings only happen in certain communities, namely the Kurdish, in the country” (Pervizat, 
2009, p.7; Sirman, 2006; Yıldız-Tahincioğlu, 2010a).20 By doing so, this framing serves 
reification and essentialisation of the culture of this community as if their culture (or tradition) is 
a monolithic and self- consistent whole and as if it is “static” and “resistant to change” 
(Kogacioglu, 2004, p.121). The nationalist act of associating honour killings only with Kurdish 
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culture has a consequence of “ethnicising honour killings” (Kogacioglu, 2004, p.122). 21 It 
reinforces the binary opposition between “this community” and “the others”.22 This discursive 
framework leads to “stigmatization of Kurdish communities”23 (Kogacioglu, 2004, p.122), 
whereas it shields the concept of “honour” prevailing in the dominant culture from the criticism. 
Therefore, the role and responsibility of institutions and structural forces which have contributed 
to the maintenance of “honour crimes” is obscured (Kogacioglu, 2004; Sirman, 2006).24  
Patriarchy is persistent in old and new regime, even though in different forms (Berktay, 
1998) and different gender regimes have articulated with one another at the present in Turkey 
(Sirman, 2006; Yıldız-Tahincioğlu, 2011). Modern state both shares and reproduces the concept 
of “honour” although new meanings and functions have been ascribed to it (Sirman, 2006; 
Yıldız-Tahincioğlu, 2011). Therefore, modern state should combat resilient concept of “honour” 
underlying “honour killings”- including killings framed as “custom killings”- prevailing all over 
the country cross-cutting majority and minority cultures -and different religions-, instead of 
blaming and targeting only  the “cultural tradition” of a certain community.  
No “culture” is immune to gender based violence, though violence against women may 
take many forms in different “cultures”. As cultural relativism might be a tool in the hands of 
racism; feminists should pursue a culturally sensitive, dignified, and truthful approach when 
discussing these violations (Pervizat, 2012, Personal Communication). They should ask who 
benefits from the recourse to the notions such as “tradition”, “custom” and “honour”. As 
Kogacioglu (2004) states, they should identify and demystify the power relations that underpins 
framing “honour killings” as matter of “custom” or “tradition” and they should formulate new 
agendas based on women’s experiences and concerns.  The emancipation of women can be 
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realized only if the unequal relations of power between men and women are transformed. Such a 
struggle for justice would certainly include but not limited to the feminist struggles.  
																																								 																				
*	This article is slightly changed version of the coursework submitted for the MA module entitled “Sociology of 
Human Rights II: Selected Topics” at the University of Essex. I would like to thank Prof. Dr. Mine Gencel Bek for 
her valuable support and encouragement to publish this essay and Dr. Roisin Ryan-Flood for her comments on my 
assignment. I am also thankful to Dr. Leyla Pervizat for her time, ideas, reading suggestions about Turkey and for 
her constructive and insightful comments on the last part of the article and to my kind friend Esin Aygün for her 
support to reach different resources on Turkey. I wish to thank the anonymous reviewers whose comments help to 
improve the paper by directing me to think about Turkey. My special thanks go to my husband Hakan for sharing 
my enthusiasm- and for his patience as well.  
2	Here, I use the term “multicultural societies” as nation states that adopt policies of multiculturalism officially.	
3	This article will examine the gender based violence discussions in terms of multicultural societies, i.e. the U.S, 
considering the scope of the article. Nevertheless, it will include an analysis of a case study in Turkey, a country 
which does not adopt multiculturalism officially. The reason for including Turkish is to reflect on the ways in which 
this debate relates to another social context.  
4 For more info, see http://prajnya16days.blogspot.com/2008/10/what-do-we-mean-by-gender-violence.html.  
5 This Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women “is not a treaty that states may ratify and be 
bound by, but rather it is a non-binding resolution that sets out a common international standard that states should 
follow” (Thomas and Levi, 1999, p. 141). However, it passed unanimously by the United Nations General Assembly 
(Coomaraswamy and Kois, 1999, p.177). Therefore, it could be said that there is worldwide consensus on the 
Declaration. 	
6	This list is taken from the report no. E/CN.4/2002/83 entitled “Cultural practices in the family that are violent 
towards women. For more info, see http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/ 
e06a5300f90fa0238025668700518ca4/42e7191fae543562c1256ba7004e963c/$FILE/G0210428.pdf. A more 
comprehensive list of  all forms of gender based discrimination throughout a woman’s life which made by the UN 
Population Fund, includes prenatal sex selection, battering during pregnancy, coerced pregnancy (rape during the 
war), female infanticide, emotional and psychological abuse, differential access to food, medical care, and 
education; child prostitution, dating and courtship violence, economically coerced sex,  sexual abuse in the 
workplace, rape, sexual harassment, forced prostitution, abuse of women by intimate partners, marital rape, dowry 
abuse and murders, partner homicide, abuse of women with disabilities, abuse of widows and elder abuse (which 
affects mostly women). For more info, see http://www.unfpa.org/gender/violence.htm.	
7 Okin refers to “legal universalism” by highlighting the universal principle of equality between man and women.  
8 Okin is aware of several possible interpretations of “culture”.  
9 Okin’s paper emphasises this point too much.		
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10 What she understands from the concept of feminism is “the belief that women should not be disadvantaged by 
their sex, that they should be recognized as having human dignity equal to that of men, and they should have the 
opportunity to live as fulfilling and as freely chosen lives as men can” (Okin, 1999, p.10). 
11 She defines “multiculturalism” particularly as a “claim, made in the context of basically liberal democracies, that 
minority cultures and ways of life are not sufficiently protected by the practice of ensuring individual rights of their 
members, and as a consequence these should also be protected through special group rights or privileges” (Okin, 
1999, pp.10-11).		
12 Right to culture has given place in human rights discourse and ““rights to individuals to “belong to” and “enjoy” 
a culture is enshrined in different international instruments… in this formulation, cultural features are seen as 
intrinsically valuable and worthy of recognition and legal protection” (Cowan, Dembour, and Wilson, 2001, p.8). 
One reflection of the renewed interest in the “minority rights” and “right to culture” could be seen in the liberal 
theories of multiculturalism. Okin criticizes multiculturalism with reference to Kymlicka’s liberal egalitarian theory. 
Kymlicka tries to incorporate and balance both individual rights and group rights together. According to him, there 
is no discrepancy between minority cultural rights and a weak form of universalism. Kymlicka makes a distinction 
between two kinds of groups rights, namely ‘external protections’ and “internal restrictions”. “External protections” 
aims at decreasing “groups vulnerability to economic and political power of the larger society…[and] can help to 
promote justice between ethno-cultural groups” (Kymlicka, 1999, pp.31-32). “Internal restrictions” impede the 
individual members to challenge, change and leave traditional cultures and practices. Therefore, a liberal theory of 
minority group rights, according to Kymlicka, does not allow internal restrictions, as they result in the violation of 
autonomy of individuals as well as condoning of injustice in the group (Kymlicka, 1999, p.31). Therefore, 
Kymlicka’s solution to the problems posed by Okin is recognizing external protections and dismissing internal 
restrictions. 
13	 There is a difference in the way that Kymlicka and Okin approaches the relationship between feminism and 
multiculturalism. Whereas Okin thinks there is a tension between feminism and multiculturalism, Kymlicka suggests 
that there is much in common between them: both feminism and multiculturalism suggest more focus on the 
structure of societal institutions, considering the inadequacy of individual rights; they point out the inadequacy of 
liberal theory to guarantee the minority rights and women’s rights, being indifferent to the special needs of the 
groups and they indicate a similar remedy which is “a group right that is not available to the rest of the population’ 
(Kymlicka, 1999, pp.32-22). Therefore, Kymlicka locates this relationship between two different sets of rights at the 
intersection of the pursuit of social justice. According to Okin, this relationship is as a clash between women’s 
human rights and culture, in other words, universalism and cultural relativism.	
14	There are four different meanings of essentialism (Philips, 2010). First meaning of essentialism is the belief that 
everyone identified with a particular category carry particular characteristics. This view raises some problems, since 
overgeneralization of particular characteristics leads to stereotyping and it deter people from seeing different 
characteristics that do not match with their prejudices. Therefore, it results in discrimination. The second form of 
essentialism claims that particular category itself, not individuals constituting this category, carry some inherent 
characteristics or essence in it. The difficulty with this account is that it regards socially and historically constructed 
differences as natural, not the product of social relations. The third version of essentialism, is the way that social 
movements and political groups recognizes social groups and “the attribution of essential personhood to group” 
(Philips, 2010, pp.69-80). However, it is contested whether we could regard these kinds of groups as homogenized 
and unified entities. The final account of essentialism is a more normative claim. It puts forth that everyone in a 
group have same “essential characteristics”. This view holds that members of the group can act within the 
framework of the essential characteristics. Therefore, any deviation from to the essential component of the category 
results in member’s losing its membership in the eyes of the outsiders, at the theoretical level. This form of 
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essentialism reinforces the naturalization of differences. At time same time, it is more subtle and sometimes difficult 
to distinguish it from “innocent forms of generalization” (Philips, 2010, pp.69-82).  
 
15 The use of the gender-neutral term “homicide” and gender biased word “manslaughter” is found problematic. 
Therefore, there is an increasing use of the word femicide/feminicide (kadın cinayeti) to describe gender related 
killings of women. For the conceptual evolution of the terms, see 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Women/A.HRC.20.16_En.pdf 
16 Honour is “a gender based power relationship” (Sirman, 2006, p.59) and aims at “controlling and regulating 
women’s sexualities, lives, choices, and autonomies within the hegemonic masculine order” despite being “culture 
and language specific and a historically contingent issue” (Pervizat, 2009, p.2). “Honour killing” is a form of 
“honour crime” and it includes but not limited to “killings in the name of custom” (“custom kilings”). Honour crime, 
is a broader category which denotes the violation of women’s human rights such as right to work, right to travel, 
reproductive rights and right to life (Sirman, 2006) and committed in order to punish and control women who refuse 
to (or cannot) follow the principles of “honour code” prevalent in the society (Sirman, 2006, p.43) 
17 For the justification of the Article, see http://www.cezakanunu.net/tck-madde-29/. 
18 For detailed info, see “Honour Killings: Scourge of Turkey” http://www.aina.org/news/20110710160625.htm. 
19 For different cases where sentences are reduced because of “unjust provocation”, see “Namus Cinayetlerinde Ağır 
Tahrik Israrı: Yargı ağır tahrikte ısrarlı” 
http://www.savaskarsitlari.org/arsiv.asp?ArsivTipID=5&ArsivAnaID=34120 and “Erkek adalet tahrik peşinde” 
http://sosyalistfeministkolektif.org/feminist-gundem/kadin-cinayetleri-/118-erkek-adalet-tahrik-pesinde. In her 
analysis of the decisions of the Second Higher Criminal Court of Şanlıurfa between 1974-2002 on murder and 
attempted murder cases in which women were slain or victimized, Belge (2006) traces the changes in the application 
of “unjust provocation” in the related Court’s decisions. She shows that “the application of unjust provocation” 
impairs the principle of equality before the law, and therefore ignores women’s citizenship status and reveals the 
failure of state to protect women’s right to life.  
20 Kogacioglu (2004) uses the term “ethnicization of tradition effect” to explain the practice of linking honour 
killings to an ethnic group, namely the Kurdish.  
21This point is also emphasised by Bingul Durbas in a interview entitled “Honor Killings: The Scourge of Turkey”. 
For the interview, see http://www.aina.org/news/20110710160625.htm. 
22 Analysing newspaper articles written by two columnists, Yıldız-Tahincioğlu (2010b) shows how the mainstream 
media creates a distinction between “us” and “the others”, and therefore, reproduces discriminatory discourses, by 
the representing “custom killings” as a feature of Kurdish culture.  
23 Bingul Durbas makes this point as well. For the interview, see http://www.aina.org/news/20110710160625.htm. 
24 Belge (2006) shows the role of the Courts in perpetuation of honour killings through analysing the decisions of 
the Second Higher Criminal Court of Şanlıurfa between 1974-2002 . She states that the Court concerned has started 
to consider and discuss “custom killings” (töre cinayeti) in 1990s. Although the Court had taken moderate approach 
towards “killings in the name of honour” at the time, they disapproved the murder of the women in the name of 
“custom”. Belge states that the related Court has recognised the validity of the “traditional” point of view (or 
validity of “tradition”), by refering to the notions of “tradition” or “custom” (“örf ve adet”) . Therefore the Court’s 
act of recognising “tradition” is also an act of constituting it. 
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